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You Buy It, You Break It: A Comment 
on Dispersing the Cloud 
Aaron Perzanowski* 
Personal property occupies a precarious position in the 
digital marketplace.1 In the analog world, we have relied on 
stable, predictable property interests in our documents, media, 
and devices to guarantee us a reasonable degree of control over 
those objects and a reasonable degree of autonomy in our 
interactions with them. But in our increasingly digital 
environment, a cluster of interrelated developments have 
conspired against meaningful property interests in the digital 
stuff that makes up so much of our lives. As a result, rather than 
making our own choices about how we use and dispose of those 
digital objects, we often find ourselves dependent on the 
permission and good will of IP rights holders, technology 
platforms, and service providers.  
So how did this change come about? First, as both mass 
media distribution and personal record keeping shift away from 
shipping and storing hardcopies to shuffling bits around the 
network, the things we’ve grown accustomed to owning—physical 
copies—are disappearing. As a practical matter, we stand in a 
very different relationship to a file in our desk drawer than we do 
to a file on a cloud server. Legal rights aside, one is in our 
immediate possession and control; the other is remotely stored 
and our interactions with it are mediated by third party 
technology. Second, restrictive end user licenses and terms of use 
intentionally undermine consumer ownership and control. Often, 
those terms insist that digital goods are not sold, but merely 
licensed—a declaration that is at odds with both established 
consumer expectations and retailers’ own marketing claims.2 
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 1. See generally AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF 
OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016) [hereinafter 
END OF OWNERSHIP] (describing the erosion of consumer ownership). 
 2. See generally Aaron Perzanowski & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, What We Buy 
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Other times, those terms grant service providers and other online 
intermediaries generous rights to use, modify, monetize, and 
retain user-generated content.3 In both cases, contractual 
language—often in the absence of meaningful consent—is 
leveraged to shift the balance of power between individuals and 
service providers who draft these typically unread and often 
unreadable terms.4 Third, digital rights management and control 
over embedded software mean that, even for the physical devices 
that we buy and presumably own, manufacturers can assert 
ongoing control over how and even whether we can use them.5 
Even though we possess and own these physical devices, the 
software that defines their operation often serves another master. 
These concerns are not merely abstract or theoretical. The 
past few years have shown us increasingly frequent glimpses into 
a future without ownership. We see it when companies like 
Autodesk use their license terms to prohibit the resale of 
authorized physical copies of software.6 We see it when Amazon 
                                                                                                     
When We “Buy Now,” 165 U. PENN. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2017) (reporting 
survey results establishing that the “Buy Now” button is deceptive for digital 
media goods) (on file with author). 
 3. See Daniel Martin, Dispersing the Cloud: Reaffirming the Right to 
Destroy in a New Era of Digital Property, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467, 510–11 
(2017) (noting terms and conditions of various cloud providers). The public 
policy exception Martin outlines to avoid the implications of these sorts of terms 
is a clever one and would represent an improvement for digital consumers. Id. at 
56–58. But I favor a more fundamental rethinking of digital contract formation 
and enforcement that would prevent the automatic transfer of rights from 
consumers to service providers. See END OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 1, at 66–70, 
174–176 (describing this approach). 
 4. See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, 
Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form 
Contracts (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 195, 2014, at 22), 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1199&context=nyu_lewp (finding 
that “only one or two out of every thousand retail software shoppers chooses to 
access the license agreement, and those few that do spend too little time, on 
average, to have read more than a small portion of the license text”). 
 5. See, e.g., Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Do You Own the 
Software that Runs Your Tesla?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2016 4:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-perzanowski-schultz-tesla-software-
ownership-20161104-story.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2017) (discussing how we 
ended up in a “world where device makers can dictate how we use the products 
we buy and reasonably believe we own”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 6. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(enforcing a software license that characterized transfer of a physical copy as a 
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remotely deletes ebooks—copies of George Orwell’s 1984, no 
less—from the devices of its customers.7 We see it when Keurig 
coffeemakers, relying on optical sensors, refuse to brew off-brand 
coffee in open mutiny against their owners.8 We see it when John 
Deere insists that farmers who pay tens of thousands of dollars 
for the company’s tractors don’t own the software embedded in 
them, code necessary to make even the simplest of repairs.9 We 
see it when Google-owned Nest bricks thousands of Revolv home 
automation hubs simply because the company lost interest in 
supporting the product.10  
And, as Daniel Martin powerfully argues, we see the erosion 
of ownership when users are prevented from destroying the files 
they store in the cloud.11 Just like possession, alienation, and use, 
the right to destroy fits comfortably in the bundle of rights we 
                                                                                                     
license). 
 7. See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18am
azon.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2017) (“Digital books bought for the Kindle are 
sent to it over a wireless network. Amazon can also use that network to 
synchronize electronic books between devices—and apparently to make them 
vanish.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See Ted Cooper, Bad News for Keurig Green Mountain Investors: 
TreeHouse Foods Says Keurig 2.0 Technology Can Be Cracked, MOTLEY FOOL 
(June 23, 2014, 11:23 AM), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/06/23/
bad-news-for-keurig-green-mountain-investors-treeh.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 
2017) (noting that “one of Keurig 2.0’s biggest selling points for investors is its 
potential to keep unlicensed brands from using its platform”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 9. See, e.g., Kyle Wiens, New High-Tech Farm Equipment Is a Nightmare 
for Farmers, WIRED (Feb. 5, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/new-
high-tech-farm-equipment-nightmare-farmers (last visited Feb. 6, 2017) (noting 
challenges faced by farmers and independent repair shops) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Darin Bartholomew, Long Comment 
Regarding a Proposed Exemption Under 17 U.S.C. 1201, at 6 
(2015), http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments-032715/class%2021/John_Deer
e_Class21_1201_2014.pdf (claiming that farmers merely had “an implied license 
for the life of the vehicle to operate the vehicle”). 
 10. See Arlo Gilbert, The Time that Tony Fadell Sold Me a Container of 
Hummus, MEDIUM (Apr. 3, 2016), https://medium.com/@arlogilbert/the-time-
that-tony-fadell-sold-me-a-container-of-hummus-cb0941c762c1#.nhl96qogu (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“Google is intentionally bricking hardware that I own. 
They don’t even dance around it . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 11. See generally Martin, supra note 3. 
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typically extend to property owners.12 Whether we conceptualize 
destruction as a freestanding right or a logical extension of the 
right to exclude, a person who owns a thing can—with some 
important exceptions—destroy it.13 Businesses and individuals 
destroy sensitive paper records all the time. Independent legal 
obligations might caution against zealous shredding—impending 
civil litigation or a criminal investigation, for example—but 
otherwise, the law of property won’t intervene. Even destroying 
personal property that embodies someone else’s intellectual 
property is generally permitted. So if churchgoers in Alamogordo, 
New Mexico, want to burn their Harry Potter books in protest 
against the-boy-who-lived’s “satanic darkness,” they are free to do 
so, fire codes notwithstanding.14 Or if Canadian football fans 
burn Bon Jovi albums to protest the idea of the singer relocating 
the Buffalo Bills to Toronto, thereby breaching the NFL’s 
northern border, the band’s record label can’t stop them.15 U.S. 
copyright law guards against destruction in only rare 
circumstances, when a work of visual art is deemed one of 
“recognized stature.”16 So the Rothkos may be safe, but lots of 
other valuable works are destroyed all the time. Some, like 
Tibetan sand mandalas, are destroyed by their creators as part of 
                                                                                                     
 12. See id. at 32 (discussing the “sticks” in the bundle of property rights). 
 13. See id. at 18 (noting that “the right to destroy is recognized, but limited; 
tolerated, but disfavored”). 
 14. See Sarah Hall, Harry Potter and the Sermon of Fire, GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 
2002, 6:17 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/01/books.harry
potter (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“As hundreds of residents opposed to the book 
burning protested, several hundred worshippers listened to the church’s 
founder, Pastor Jack Brock, denounce the fictional wizard as satanic, before 
filing outside to toss at least 30 Potter books into the flames.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 15. See Jason MacNeil, Toronto Argonauts Fans Burn Bon Jovi Albums to 
Protest a NFL Team in Canada, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/08/18/toronto-argonauts-burn-bon-jovi-
albums_n_5688608.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (reporting that 
“approximately 15 fans of the Canadian Football League’s Toronto Argonauts 
showed their venom towards the rock star by lighting a handful of CDs”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 16. See 17 U.S.C. §106A(a)(3)(B) (2016) (providing the author of a work of 
visual art with the right “to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized 
stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a 
violation of that right”). 
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the creative process.17 Others, like the collection of graffiti at 
5Pointz in New York City, are destroyed by real property owners 
who prefer new development to preservation.18 
As Martin notes, courts have expressed the greatest 
skepticism of the right to destroy when it comes to real 
property.19 In those cases, the worry was couched in terms of 
waste and its broader impact on society. Despite Blackstone’s 
most famous quote, property rights are not absolute.20 And 
there’s nothing inherently inappropriate about courts taking into 
account the impact of a property owner’s exercise of her rights on 
her neighbors, many of whom have property interests of their 
own at stake. Crucially, though, those courts were asked to 
permit the destruction of property in accordance with a deceased 
property owner’s will, as in Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co.21 
This form of dead hand destruction strikes many courts as 
particularly inappropriate and, unlike the wishes of a living, 
breathing property owner, particularly easy to disregard. But if 
Mrs. Johnston, the decedent in Eyerman, had decided to raze her 
home the day before she died, few courts would have stopped her 
on the basis of waste. Even if courts did routinely prevent living 
owners from tearing down their homes, the rationales that would 
support such restrictions on the right of destruction, Martin 
convincingly argues, do not apply to digital files.22 Digital files 
are easily reproduced; they are rarely unique or uniquely 
valuable; and their destruction does not typically visit collateral 
harm on others. 
                                                                                                     
 17. See SUSAN I. BUCHALTER, MANDALA SYMBOLISM AND TECHNIQUES: 
INNOVATIVE APPROACHES FOR PROFESSIONALS 11 (2012) (discussing the Tibetan 
works of art). 
 18. See Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 988 F. Supp. 2d 212, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013) (noting the destruction of works of arguably recognized stature at 
5Pointz). 
 19. See Martin, supra note 3, at 13–15 (discussing cases in which courts 
refuse to enforce a property owner’s desire to destroy her own real property). 
 20. Id. at 10 (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2). 
 21. 524 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (refusing to uphold the will of 
the decedent, Louise Woodruff Johnston, by instructing the testator to destroy 
her home). 
 22. See Martin, supra note 3, at 40–42 (arguing that digital property 
cannot be wasted in the same sense as real, or even physical, property). 
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Martin offers a timely and persuasive case for reinvigorating 
the right to destroy digital files in the cloud. As more of our 
digital lives are stored on “somebody else’s computer,”23 users 
who want to retain and assert some control over the use of the 
documents and data they upload would benefit from a right to 
eliminate cloud copies. But the right to destroy is part of a larger 
set of questions about the role digital intangible property should 
play in our networked present and future. To tie Martin’s 
insights into that broader conversation, I want to elaborate 
further on one question addressed in Dispersing the Cloud—the 
nature and legal status of property rights in digital assets. 
How should we conceptualize a property interest in a digital 
file stored in the cloud? Our natural instinct might be to 
analogize to other, more familiar scenarios. One could be forgiven 
for thinking of cloud storage as a mere extension of our local 
devices, not all that different from external hard drives. The user 
interfaces of popular cloud services like Dropbox, Box, and Google 
Drive encourage this misconception. If you install their desktop 
applications, they create a local folder that syncs with your cloud 
account. You can add, move, and edit files exactly as you would 
with purely local ones. And you delete them the same way as 
well, by dragging them to the trash icon on your desktop, for 
example. This interface choice may well lull users into a false 
sense of security, leading them to believe that they have as much 
control over cloud copies as they do local ones. But as Martin 
explains, that isn’t the case.24 For local copies, you own and 
possess the physical medium in which those copies are stored. 
But you certainly don’t own Dropbox’s servers even though your 
files are stored on them. 
An analogy to a different instance of remotely-stored 
property might be more useful. Maybe your cloud file is more like 
a family heirloom in a safe deposit box. You don’t own the box or 
                                                                                                     
 23. See Danny Palmer, We Should Replace the Word ‘Cloud’ with 
‘Somebody Else's Computer’, Says Security Expert, COMPUTING (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2316368/we-should-replace-the-word-
cloud-with-somebody-elses-computer-says-security-expert (last visited Feb. 20, 
2017) (noting that security expert Graham Cluley suggests “replacing all 
instances of the word ‘cloud’ with ‘somebody else’s computer’”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 24. See Martin, supra note 3, at 53 (explaining that the servers that make 
up “the cloud” do not belong to users of cloud services). 
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the bank in which it is stored, but you do own the contents. Just 
like grandpa’s stamp collection, perhaps you own the files even if 
you don’t currently possess them. But this analogy, too, has its 
limits. There’s no obligation for the bank to destroy the contents 
of your safe deposit box upon request; the bank does not make 
routine copies of the contents of safe deposit boxes in the course 
of normal operations; nor does the bank require you to grant it 
the right to retain copies of your heirlooms as a condition for 
renting the box in the first place. But perhaps the most 
significant distinction has to do with the nature of the thing 
owned. The stamp collection is tangible personal property, subject 
to well established common law doctrines; your files on the cloud 
are something potentially quite different. 
As Martin acknowledges, the existence of digital intangible 
property rights in cloud-based assets is uncertain.25 In large part, 
that uncertainty is a function of the intangible nature of the 
assets at issue. In Blackstone’s era, the dominant view of 
property imagined a legal right to control a thing. The twentieth 
century saw a shift in our thinking about property that embraced 
the idea of property regulating relationships between people 
rather than an owner’s relationship to a thing.26 Under that more 
modern view, the thing—the res—became far less important to 
our conception of property; the existence of a property right does 
not depend on a particular tangible object.27 Nonetheless, most 
familiar examples of property rights are still tied to tangible 
things.  
There are exceptions of course. The quasi-property rights 
created by copyright and patent law are examples. But they are 
also something of a special case. Confronted with a public goods 
problem that could lead to the undersupply of creative works, 
Congress crafted statutory exclusive rights in intangible 
creations. IP protection is not a function of the common law; it is 
                                                                                                     
 25. See id. at 19–23 (addressing the question of how the law defines digital 
property). 
 26. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710 (1917) 
(discussing legal conceptions of property throughout the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries). 
 27. Of course, this is a necessarily cursory overview of a long-running 
debate in property law.  
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a statutory creature. But IP is not the only example. The law 
recognizes other forms of intangible property, ranging from 
securities to government franchises like liquor licences and taxi 
medallions. Some of those forms of intangible property have deep 
common law roots; others are the product of more recent 
legislative action.  
The question is whether courts will embrace property rights 
in the sorts of intangible digital assets consumers store in the 
cloud. Today, there is little clear precedent for such digital 
intangible property. But efforts to carve out consumer property 
rights in digital assets are underway. At least in Europe, as 
Martin notes, there have been promising signs.28 Courts there 
have recognized that consumers are entitled to resell digital 
goods they buy, even when those goods are delivered digitally. So, 
for example, when Oracle sued UsedSoft for allowing users to 
purchase secondhand digitally-downloaded software, the court 
held that since the software was originally purchased lawfully 
from Oracle, the consumers owned it and could dispose of it, even 
though they didn’t own any particular tangible copy.29 Instead, 
they owned and could alienate their intangible right to download 
and use the software.30 Likewise, a Dutch court held that lawfully 
acquired ebooks could be resold despite the fact that rights to 
intangible assets rather than particular copies of the books were 
changing hands.31 
In the United States, however, the picture has not been quite 
so promising.32 When a company called ReDigi launched a similar 
                                                                                                     
 28. See Martin, supra note 3, at 22–23 (noting that, “according to the 
European Court of Justice, there is ‘no difference whether the copy of the 
computer program was made available by means of a download or on a 
DVD/CD-ROM’” (citing Michael S. Richardson, Comment, The Monopoly on 
Digital Distribution, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 153, 168 
(2014))). 
 29. Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. I-
0000, at ¶ 89. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See generally Rb. Den Haag, 3 september 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:10962, IEF 14164 (VOB/ Stichting Leenrecht e.a.) 
(Neth.), available at http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id= 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:10962; Hof Amsterdam, 20 januari 2015, 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2015:66, NUV/Tom Kabinet (Neth.), available at 
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2015:66. 
 32. In one positive development, states have started to take the notion of 
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resale marketplace for lawfully purchased digital music, it was 
promptly sued by Capitol Records.33 Copyright law’s first sale 
doctrine, of course, recognizes consumer property rights in the 
tangible copies they own.34 But because of the digital nature of 
the purchases and subsequent transfers, ReDigi users weren’t 
selling physical copies; they were alienating an intangible asset—
namely, the legal right to download and use the purchased music. 
As the ReDigi opinion makes clear, current copyright doctrine is 
not well positioned to take these sorts of rights in digital assets 
into account. While copyrights are themselves rights in 
intangibles, the framework for mediating the competing rights of 
consumers and creators is built around ownership of physical 
copies.35 Working within that framework, the district court found 
that ReDigi’s platform did not facilitate lawful transfers, but 
infringing acts of reproduction and distribution.36 The case is 
currently on appeal to the Second Circuit, so there is still hope of 
bringing U.S. law into alignment with its more enlightened 
European counterpart on the question of meaningful property 
rights in intangible digital assets. 
Regardless of the case’s ultimate outcome, ReDigi illustrates 
some of the challenges for robust digital property rights. The first 
is the difficulty of identifying the thing, whether tangible or 
                                                                                                     
digital assets seriously. See Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets and Digital 
Accounts Act, 79 Del. Laws, c. 416, § 1 (2014) (providing, among other things, 
that end-user license agreement provisions that limit a fiduciary's access to a 
digital asset or digital account of an account holder are generally void as against 
public policy); NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM 
FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT 1 (2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org/ 
shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2014_UFADA
A_Final.pdf (recommending a uniform statute that would “vest fiduciaries with 
the authority to access, control, or copy digital assets and accounts”). 
 33. See generally Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 34. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2016) (providing that “the owner of a particular 
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by 
such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord”). 
 35. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Personal and 
Intellectual Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1253–55 (2015) (arguing 
that exhaustion need not rely on the existence of a physical copy). 
 36. See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 660–61 (granting “Capitol's motion for 
summary judgment on its claims for ReDigi's direct, contributory, and vicarious 
infringement of its distribution and reproduction rights”) 
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intangible, that the user owns. If consumers have property rights 
in cloud-based assets, what exactly is it that they own? It’s easy 
to conceptualize a consumer owning a physical copy. It is a thing 
we can see and hold. Even digital copies exist in physical form, 
whether on a local drive or a remote server. But a property 
interest in a digital asset—whether for purposes of alienation or 
destruction—is not just a right in a particular copy stored in a 
particular medium. The right to delete or transfer a particular 
physical copy is not a very valuable one in a networked 
environment, where copies are plentiful. Instead, digital 
intangible property must give the owner the right to control the 
disposition of files or data that may be embodied in multiple 
copies, stored in different places, and created at different times. 
To the extent they transcend particular copies, property 
rights in intangible assets look a bit like IP rights. Those rights 
are not defined primarily by physical identity, but by 
informational content. For IP rights holders, the thing they own 
is the intangible creation—original expression in the case of 
copyright or a novel invention in the case of patent. Rights in 
those intangible things are implicated, if not necessarily 
infringed, whenever others make specified uses that reflect the 
underlying informational content of their expression or 
invention.37 
Advocates for this new form of digital intangible property 
envision a set of rights that are broader than traditional personal 
property rights because they aren’t entombed in a particular 
tangible object. At the same time, they are narrower than IP 
rights because they don’t extend to every instantiation of the 
underlying informational content. To illustrate the difference, 
let’s think about the analog world first. Let’s say Alice buys a 
copy of Julien Baker’s album Sprained Ankle on vinyl. Alice owns 
the copy, and her property right is tied to that object. By virtue of 
her ownership, Alice can sell her copy and the legal rights 
associated with it to Bob. But her ownership of that copy doesn’t 
entitle her to pick up other copies wherever she finds them, claim 
them as her own, and sell them. In contrast, the copyright in 
                                                                                                     
 37. In copyright law, independent creation is not infringement regardless of 
similarity of expression. But in patent law, even an independent inventor is an 
infringer. 
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Sprained Ankle extends to every copy of the record, regardless of 
who owns it.38 
Now let’s say Alice, rather than buying a vinyl record, buys 
the album in a digital format. The copyright continues to apply to 
all copies of Sprained Ankle, but Alice’s rights take on a 
somewhat different form. If Alice has digital intangible property 
rights, she could transfer her rights to the digital music she 
purchased. But, crucially, those rights are not tied to any 
particular copy of the record. In fact, Alice could sell her digital 
property to Bob without transferring a copy at all. Instead, Alice’s 
access to copies stored on a cloud server would be terminated, and 
Bob’s access would be enabled. It’s the transfer of legal rights 
rather than the copy that is key. Just as in the analog world, 
Alice’s ownership of Sprained Ankle as a digital asset does not 
mean she can claim and transfer Charlie’s rights to Sprained 
Ankle simply because they both bought the same record. Alice’s 
rights may not be tied to a particular tangible copy, but they are 
still limited in scope; in this case, they are defined by her initial 
purchase. The same would be true for the right to destroy. Alice 
would be entitled to delete a range of copies that are in some 
sense hers, but not necessarily every copy that reflects similar or 
even identical information. 
This discussion points to a second challenge for digital 
intangible property—resolving the tension between competing 
property interests. As these examples show, there are often 
multiple, distinct owners and interests at stake when we talk 
about property. So the cloud server may be Amazon’s personal 
property, the digital assets it contains may belong to a number of 
consumers, and the copyrights in the works those files represent 
are the IP of an even larger set of rights holders. Precisely how 
those rights interact—when each must yield to the other—is a 
crucial question in developing a workable set of property 
interests. When it comes to the interaction between IP and 
personal property, the exhaustion principle has successfully 
mediated that relationship for well over a century.39 And while 
                                                                                                     
 38. Some of those rights, notably the exclusive right of distribution, are 
exhausted upon transfer of the copy to a new owner. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2016) 
(codifying the exhaustion doctrine). 
 39. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 35, at 1212 (“[E]xhaustion is an 
inherent part of copyright law's balance between the rights of creators and the 
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exhaustion, as a general principle, offers a useful guide for 
defining the relationship between IP and digital intangible 
property, the details are crucial in order to strike an appropriate 
balance between consumer rights and creative incentives.40  
Since the right to destroy focuses largely on control over 
user-created data, Martin is able to deftly sidestep the 
complications that arise from conflicts between IP and digital 
intangible property, though that won’t be the case in every 
instance. By directing our focus to an area where digital assets 
matter but are not fraught with IP implications, Martin is 
advancing the debate in a potentially fruitful direction.41 
Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the rights of owners of 
personal property, like servers, may conflict with those of digital 
asset owners.42 An absolute right to delete digital assets may well 
impose an unreasonable burden on service providers. There are 
lots of ways this balance between the interests of owners of 
servers and digital assets might be struck. The broader point is 
that the introduction of new property rights requires us to think 
through their implications for the web of existing property 
interests. When it comes to the right to destroy, Dispersing the 
Cloud provides a valuable foundation for just that conversation. 
                                                                                                     
rights of the public. It is a fundamental component of almost every intellectual 
property system.”). 
 40. See END OF OWNERSHIP, supra note 1, at 180–85 (describing the 
considerations that courts should give to various consumer rights). 
 41. Delaware’s Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets and Digital Accounts Act 
made a similar move when it limited transfers “to the extent permitted 
under . . . any end user license agreement.” Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets 
and Digital Accounts Act, 79 Del. Laws c. 416, § 5004.  
 42. See Martin, supra note 3, at 52 (addressing why digital property owners 
should be able “to wrest control over their data from the hands of cloud 
providers” (emphasis added)). 
